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 
Abstract— Resistive random access memories (RRAMs) have 
arisen as a competitive candidate for non-volatile memories due to 
their scalability, simple structure, fast switching speed and 
compatibility with conventional back-end processes. The 
stochastic switching mechanism and intrinsic variability of 
RRAMs still poses challenges that must be overcome prior to their 
massive memory commercialization. However, these very same 
features open a wide range of potential applications for these 
devices in hardware security. In this context, this work proposes 
the generation of a random bit by means of simultaneous write 
operation of two parallel cells so that only one of them 
unpredictably switches its state. Electrical simulations confirm the 
strong stochastic behavior and stability of the proposed primitive. 
Exploiting this fact, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) like 
primitive is implemented based on modified 1 transistor – 1 
resistor (1T1R) array structure. 
 
Keywords—RRAM, PUF, security, stochastic switching, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
n RRAM (Resistive random access memory) is typically 
composed of an electrode/dielectric/electrode stack 
structure. Its physical mechanism relies on formation and 
rupture of conductive filament (CF) with defects in oxide 
(dielectric) between the two metal electrodes [1]. For a fresh 
RRAM, an initial operation, called the forming process, is 
usually required to generate the CF. The forming process is 
critical since it determines the CF characteristics, which in turn 
influence RRAM performance. Once the CF is formed, an 
RRAM can reversible switch between a high-resistance state 
(HRS) and a low-resistance state (LRS). This switching 
behavior is obtained applying voltage pulses between the 
electrodes. The switching operation from HRS to LRS is called 
the set process. On the contrary, the switching operation from 
LRS to HRS is called the reset process. 
Due to the randomness of the defect generation and 
annihilation, the shape of the CF presents variability from cell 
to cell and also from cycle-to-cycle, with significant impact in 
the resistance of the device [2]-[4]. Hence, this stochastic 
switching mechanism still poses challenges that must be 
overcome prior to the massive commercialization of RRAM 
 
 
memories. Nevertheless, the very same challenges have 
positioned these devices as a promising alternative for the 
development of hardware security applications [5]. In fact, 
special interest is focusing on Physical Unclonable Function 
(PUFs), security primitives which embrace manufacturing 
variations resulting from the IC fabrication process for 
authentication and secret key storage purposes [6]-[7].  
This paper proposes to use RRAMs as a hardware intrinsic 
security feature which is similar to PUFs. A preliminary work 
can be found in [8]. The proposal is implemented in a 1 
transistor – 1 resistor (1T1R) array. It improves over state-of-
the-art by integrating parts of the quantization, which is 
required to generate a secret bit, into the design of the RRAM. 
The rest of the work is organized as follows. The works related 
with RRAM based PUFs is reviewed in Section II. Section III 
briefly explains the basis of 1T1R array. Section IV proposes a 
cell structure based on two parallel RRAMs to derive a random 
bit. The PUF-like implementation is presented in Section V. 
Section VI summarizes the electrical simulations results 
confirming the feasibility of the proposal. Finally, the 
conclusions of the work are given. 
II. RRAMS FOR HARDWARE INTRINSIC SECURITY 
Emerging memories are attracting the attention of the 
research community for security applications. Although recent 
works have appeared based on RRAM [9]-[21] and STT-
MRAM (Spin Transfer Torque Magnetic RAM) [22]-[24] 
technologies, RRAM is positioning as the most promising 
candidate for these applications. Just like traditional silicon 
based PUFs, RRAMs allow extracting a hardware intrinsic 
secret from process variations. The secret does not depend on a 
configuration which is selected by a challenge. Thus, the 
concept is similar to a so-called weak PUF [7]. Such primitives 
are typically used to derive a unique key which is inseparably 
connected to hardware. In case of RRAMs, this key only 
depends on variations in the CF, which is reflected by a cell-
specific switching characteristic from HRS to LRS and vice 
versa. The state (HRS or LRS) is kept after power off. 
The permanent storage of a value in form of a specific 
resistance of a certain RRAM cell together with the derivation 
of the secret from hardware intrinsic variations, places RRAMs 
at the border between traditional PUFs and non-volatile 
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A
 memories (NVMs). Since RRAMs are a type of NVM they have 
the potential vulnerability to be read out after powered down. 
However, due to the small size of the cells (approx. 10 nm size 
square) and since the RRAMs are embedded between metal 
layers, it is expected that it will be hard to read out in practice. 
However, this attack vector has to be considered in future and 
might require adding some countermeasures to achieve a high 
level of security. But the NVM-characteristic of RRAMs, 
which is well suited to reliably store information, also adds a 
benefit. A traditional PUF which is used for key storage 
requires strong error correction to reduce the expected bit error 
probability of the PUF (typically 15% to 25% per bit) to an 
acceptable key error probability of 10ି଺ to 10ିଽ per key. A 
more reliable primitive would allow reducing the overhead 
during runtime and in hardware. Another feature of RRAMs 
which might be used in future is that the secret stored in the 
RRAM cells can easily be erased permanently by applying a 
high voltage pulse. This can enable many additional 
applications for RRAM based security primitives in the future. 
To derive a secret from an RRAM, the most common 
approaches are based on 1T1R array structures. In [9], initially 
all cells are put to the same resistance state (HRS or LRS). Two 
sensing modes are proposed to obtain random bits: the first 
compares the resistance of one cell against a reference cell and 
the second, which is reported to derive betters results, pairwise 
compares the resistances of two cells. The secret in these 
approaches is extracted by, in the first case, detecting if the 
resistance is above or below a certain threshold and, in the 
second case, looking at which of the cells has higher or lower 
resistance. Chen [10] extends the second approach from [9] by 
applying two n-bit words, which are used to select two times n 
RRAM cells. An n bit response is received by bit-wise 
comparison. In [11] the cells are first set to LRS and then a weak 
reset operation is applied, so that every cell has 50% of 
probability to switch to HRS. Instead of comparing RRAM 
cells, the experimental work in [12] selects a reference current 
so that for 50% of the cells the current is higher and for the rest 
50% the current is lower than the reference when they are 
measured during the read operation. As dummy cells are 
leveraged to derive this reference, this concept is similar to the 
first sensing mode described in [9]. 
Purely passive (without transistors) crossbar array 
architectures have also been examined for PUF applications. 
The authors in [13] presented a preliminary work based on 
memristors. Weak write operations, i.e. shorter pulse widths and 
lower voltage amplitudes, are analyzed for the generation of 
random bits. The crossbar array was leveraged to build a public 
PUF (PPUF) in [14].  
Pai-You et al. [15] increase the number of bits extracted from 
an array by selecting pairs of cells from different columns. By 
comparing the resulting currents through the activated cells 
secret bits are obtained.  
Particular cell topologies are specifically designed for 
security applications. In [16] a cell composed of two RRAMs 
in series was postulated as the source of random bit generation. 
Starting both RRAMs in LRS, a reset operation is applied to 
them. The inherent variability of the switching mechanism 
causes one of the two RRAMs to become first high resistive, 
forcing the other RRAM to remain in LRS. Experimental 
evidence of this fact was presented in a subsequent work [17]. 
The recent work in [18] extend the analysis to different coupling 
configurations of two RRAM devices as the source for random 
bit generation. 
It is worth mentioning that RRAMs have also been proposed 
as true random number generator (TRNG) for applications in 
data encryption for secure communication systems [19]-[21].  
Although the research community is pushing towards RRAM 
based PUF-like structures, proposals still do not meet all 
desired requirements. 1T1R approaches are mainly restricted by 
the limits of sense amplifiers and crossbar arrays must handle 
the sneak path issue (currents that flow through other RRAMs 
rather than the target).  
The proposal in this work improves the 1T1R by integrating 
parts of the quantization for secret bit generation into the 
RRAM design. Thus, it is able to derive bits comparing quite 
different LRS and HRS resistances so that no additional 
performances are demanded from the sense amplifier. 
Simulation results show high random quality of the generated 
bits.  
III. 1T1R ARRAY  
There are mainly two array architectures for RRAM 
integration: the 1T1R and the crossbar. The former offers better 
write/read margins and has a bigger array size whereas the latter 
shows smaller cell area and lower power consumption. This 
work exploits the use of 1T1R arrays. Thus, from here on the 
focus is on this architecture.  
In a 1T1R array, see Fig. 1, each RRAM device is connected 
in series with a cell selecting transistor. Based on these 
primitives, the array is composed of word lines (WLs) 
connecting the gate terminals in the same row, bit lines (BLs) 
connecting RRAMs of the same column, and source lines (SLs) 
connecting the source terminals of transistors in the same 
column. Source lines are usually connected to ground (cf. Fig. 
2.a). Transistors in 1T1R cells select each specific cell 
independently from the others. 
A write operation is performed by applying a voltage VWL to 
the WL (this selects the cell) and simultaneously a second 
voltage (VSET or VRESET) to the corresponding BL. This is 
illustrated in Fig. 2.b and 2.c. Assuming a bipolar RRAM, a 
positive voltage (VSET > 0) or a negative voltage difference 
(VRESET < 0) between the top electrode (TE) and bottom 
electrode (BE) is required to conduct a set or a reset operation.  
For the read operation, a cell is selected by connecting the 
corresponding WL to the voltage VWL and the corresponding 
BL to the read voltage VREAD. The logical value stored in the 
cell is determined by a sense amplifier that is connected to the 
bit line and who measures the current of the RRAM when 
VREAD is applied. Notice, that VREAD is a small fraction of the 
voltage applied during a set operation. 
  Fig. 1. 4x4 1T1R array. 
 Fig. 2. a) 1T1R cell b) Set operation c) Reset operation. 
 Fig. 3. a) Cell topology for a random bit generation b) Simultaneous set 
operation. 
IV. SECRET BIT GENERATION 
A configuration with two 1T1R cells is considered for the 
generation of a secret bit. Initially, the TEs of the resistive 
elements are connected to different BLs. The BE nodes of the 
two cells are connected so that the transistors of the two 1T1R 
cells are merged in parallel behaving like a single transistor. 
This results in an 1T2R cell (cf. Fig. 3.a). Now, the bit-lines are 
virtually connected and next a simultaneous set operation 
(SSO) is performed for the two RRAMs by applying a voltage 
VSET to both BLs (cf. Fig. 3.b). The transistor’s source terminal 
is grounded and a positive voltage (VWL) is applied to the gate 
terminal. Due to the inherent RRAM variability, one of the 
devices switches first from HRS to LRS while the other remains 
HRS.  
For instance, assume that R2 switches first to LRS. Then, BE 
voltage will increase due to the higher current passing through 
R2 and the voltage divider composed of the parallel RRAMs 
and the selecting transistor. As a consequence, the current 
flowing through R1 will abruptly decrease avoiding the 
complete set process of the CF in R1 which will remain in HRS. 
Which of the RRAMs (R1 or R2) goes first to LRS and prevents 
the other from the CF set process is unpredictable and is 
exploited as the source of randomness. 
 
 Fig. 4. Experiment a) Circuit topology b) Sequence of applied stimulus. 
 
 Fig. 5. Experimental behavior of the common bottom electrode (BE) for a 
random bit generation. 
A secret bit can be extracted from the array by addressing 
either one of the two RRAMs of the 1T2R cell and reading its 
resistance. During the read operation, the TE of the non-read 
device must remain disconnected (high-impedance). In larger 
arrays, multiple response bits of 1T2R cells which are 
connected to the same word line can be read out in parallel. 
The transistors’ dimensions must be selected so that their 
equivalent resistances induce a sufficient voltage drop once the 
first RRAM switches from HRS to LRS. This must guarantee a 
big enough current cut in the second RRAM such that it 
prevents from changing to LRS. An experimental validation of 
the proposed topology has been performed with chalcogenide-
based memristors [25]-[26]. The details of the experiment are 
shown in Fig. 4, where the transistor has been replaced by a 
resistance (Fig. 4a). The characteristics were measured using a 
B2912A SMU and a TDS1002B oscilloscope. The stimulus 
applied to the circuit are illustrated in Fig. 4b. Starting with both 
memristors in HRS, a SSO is applied followed by two read 
operations, one for each memristor. During a read operation, the 
top electrode of the memristor, which is not read, is kept 
floating. Table I summarizes the values of the main parameters 
considered during the experiment. The behavior of the common 
bottom electrode (BE) is plotted in Fig. 5. During the SSO, one 
of the memristors switches its state, leading BE to an 
intermediate voltage. Afterwards, the read operations show that 
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TABLE I 
PARAMETER VALUES OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Parameter  Value 
Bit line voltage for a set operation (V) VSET 0.9 
Bit line voltage for a reset operation (V) VRESET -0.7 
Bit line voltage for a read operation (V) VREAD 0.2 
Resistance (kΩ)  RG 51 
 
 R1 is the memristor which has switched to LRS. The equivalent 
resistances after the SSO are R1 = 40 kΩ and R2 = 1.6 MΩ. 
Notice how there is more than one order of magnitude between 
them. This is consistent with the expectations for the 
technology.  
The proposed primitive has two advantages when compared 
to the serial configuration presented in [17]. Firstly, the set 
operation that generates the random bit is more abrupt than the 
corresponding reset operation required by the serial 
configuration. This decreases the probability that the two 
competing RRAMs end up with the same resistance. Secondly, 
the proposed primitive is easier to be implemented in existing 
memory arrays, as it is shown in the next section. 
V. EXTRACTING A SECRET FROM AN 1T1R ARRAY  
This section shows how a 1T1R array must be modified to 
extract hardware intrinsic secrets using 1T2R primitives. The 
1T1R array architecture must be slightly modified to connect 
two parallel RRAMs and enable the SSO. For this purpose, new 
connections between adjacent transistors from the same row are 
added. Like described above, the 1T2R cell is derived from two 
1T1R cells which are connected in parallel. Since the source 
lines are always connected to ground, the two parallel 
transistors act as an equivalent single one. To implement this 
behavior in the array, the drains of pairs of transistors in the 
same row are connected to the same WL (connection 
highlighted in blue in Fig. 6).  
Note that using pairs or transistors has the benefit that it 
reduces the asymmetries of the design, which in turn minimizes 
correlations between secret bits, a potential weakness that could 
be exploited by an attacker. Also note that the inclusion of extra 
connections implies a modification of the initial memory 
structure. The most popular method to integrate the RRAM 
structures is the backend of line (BEOL). Depending on the 
particularities of the process, these connections may derive 
different implications in the layout, which should be considered 
during the design process.  
The structure behaves like the circuit shown in Fig. 3.a. and 
Fig. 6 also illustrates how a SSO can be applied in the modified 
array. It consists of selecting the common WL for both 
transistors and applying VSET to both BLs. If required, multiple 
SSOs can be done in the same row if more BLs are activated. 
Once the SSOs are applied to the whole memory cells the write 
operations must finish. During the normal operation of the 
PUF-like primitive, only read operations are performed. This 
has advantages in terms of reliability because the small 
amplitude of the voltage pulse that is applied minimizes the 
cycle-to-cycle variability.  
Secret can be obfuscated to increase the difficulty for a 
potential attacker to read the cell by resetting the corresponding 
RRAMs. First, the WL is activated with the voltage VWL and 
then BL1 and BL2 are polarized with the voltage VRESET. Since, 
the low resistance RRAM will drive most of the current it will 
quickly reverse his resistance back to HRS, bringing the cell to 
the initial state with the two RRAMs in HRS. 
 Fig. 6. Example of a SSO. 1T2R cell highlighted in grey. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
Electrical simulations were performed with SPICE to 
evaluate the proposed PUF-like primitive [8]. MATLAB was 
used for data processing. A 1T1R array architecture with 256 x 
256 cells was built and modified to contain the 1T2R cells 
giving a total of 32768 1T2R cells. The RRAM model was 
selected from [27], where the switching mechanism relies on 
the dynamics of one-dimensional CF growth in the oxide layer. 
The selecting transistor was implemented in 65nm PTM 
technology model [28] with minimum length and a width of one 
and a half times the transistor length. Table II summarizes the 
values of the rest of parameters considered during simulations. 
 Variability was included in transistors and RRAM devices. 
The main internal variable of the RRAM model is the gap 
distance (g), i.e., average distance between the TE and the tip 
of the CF, which has an exponential influence on the RRAM 
resistance. Furthermore, some fitting parameters included in the 
model were selected to adjust the variability to match realistic 
experimental data. With these sources of variability and a 
context of simulation similar to the one reported in [29], two 
realistic cumulative distributions for the resistance states were 
obtained [8]. It must be pointed out that for the nominal case 
RLRS ≈ 10kΩ and RHRS ≈ 760kΩ, which provides almost two 
orders of magnitude between both resistances. As expected, the 
HRS distribution is wider than the one corresponding to LRS. 
During simulations, every cell of the array was initially 
programmed to HRS. Subsequently, a sequence of SSOs were 
applied in such a way that one cell of every pair was expected 
to switch to LRS. Once the whole array was written, the secret 
bits were obtained in groups of 128 by reading out the 
corresponding row addresses. Every bit was the result of a read 
operation at the left 1T1R cell of each 1T2R cell. A voltage 
VREAD was applied to the corresponding BL line of the left 
RRAM and the current was measured. The other RRAM BL 
line was kept at high-impedance state. We simulated 250 arrays 
TABLE II 
PARAMETER VALUES OF THE SIMULATIONS 
Parameter  Value 
Array size  256x256 
Bit line voltage for a set operation (V) VSET 2.5 
Bit line voltage for a reset operation (V) VRESET -1.9 
Word line voltage VWL 1.2 
Bit line voltage for a read operation (V) VREAD 0.1 
Source line voltage (V) VSL 0 
Pulse width (ns)  20 
 with Monte Carlo to include process variations.  
The performance was analyzed by means of the four usual 
parameters assessing the quality of a PUF: uniformity, 
uniqueness, robustness and bit-aliasing. Note that more 
advanced performance measures might have to be used for 
more detailed analysis in future. 
Uniformity evaluates the proportion of 0’s and 1’s in the 
PUF response. For an n-bit response, uniformity is computed as 
the percentage of Hamming weigh with respect to the number 
of bits as follows: 
Uniformity ൌ 1n෍b୧ ൈ 100
୬
୧ୀଵ
%	 (1) 
where b୧ is the i-th bit of the response. The ideal value is 50%. 
Uniformity results report that the mean of the distribution is 
close to the ideal value (μunif = 49.67 %) and the standard 
deviation σunif = 3.16 %. It must be pointed out that a detailed 
analysis of the results showed that around 0.3 % of the cells 
reported similar resistances for the RRAM pair (resistance ratio 
lower than five). This happened when the two RRAMs were 
almost identical with a very similar switching behavior. This 
phenomenon induces a proportion of cells where the read 
operation will always result in logic 0 and is assumed to be 
responsible for the mean value slower than the optimal one. The 
frequency of this fact might be tolerable in most practical cases, 
since a larger number of cells can be used and compression can 
be applied to get sufficient entropy in a derived and corrected 
secret. Alternatively, the cells can be found easily by measuring 
both RRAMs in every cell and XORing the derived bits for the 
same cell. This would allow eliminating such defects. 
Uniqueness represents the ability to distinguish a particular 
PUF among a set of PUFs of the same class. Uniqueness is 
calculated as the average inter-chip Hamming distance (HDinter) 
between the responses from k samples of the same PUF.  
HD୧୬୲ୣ୰ ൌ 2kሺk െ 1ሻ෍ ෍
HDሺB୧, B୨ሻ
n ൈ 100	%
୩
୨ୀ୧ାଵ
୩ିଵ
୧ୀଵ
 (2) 
where Bi and Bj are the n-bit responses for samples i and j. The 
ideal value for k → ∞ is 50%.  
For the calculation of (2) we took the 256 responses of 128-
bits of an array and combined for the 250 simulated arrays. The 
HDinter results are closely similar to the uniformity results but 
now with the distribution statistics of μHDinter = 50.04% and 
σHDinter = 0.12%, which are again close to the ideal uniqueness. 
Robustness represents the ability of a PUF to reproduce the 
same response. Robustness is evaluated as the intra-chip 
Hamming distance among m different responses Bi:  
HD୧୬୲୰ୟ ൌ 1m෍
HDሺB଴, B୧ሻ
n ൈ 100	%
୫
୧ୀଵ
 (3) 
where B0 is the response at nominal conditions (without noise). 
The value for an ideal PUF is 0%. 
We have simulated our PUF-like primitive at different 
temperatures. Starting at room temperature the sequences of 
SSOs were applied and the read operations were subsequently 
done to get the responses B0 from the arrays. These sequences 
of operations were repeated for each new temperature to get 
responses Bi and equation (3) was applied to evaluate HDintra, 
In Fig. 7 this metric is plotted and, as expected, it is seen that 
the performance decreases with the rise of temperature though 
it keeps under reasonable low values. However, we have not 
considered the influence of peripheral circuits, i.e. sense 
amplifiers, which may be affected by temperature and may have 
an impact during read operations. 
Bit-aliasing estimates the tendency towards 0 or 1 of a 
particular bit response in several PUFs. It gives information 
about any systematic or spatially caused bias. Bit-aliasing of the 
i-th bit of k devices is estimated as the relative Hamming weigh 
of the response on a certain position over all devices. Its ideal 
value is 50%.  
Bit െ aliasing ൌ 1k෍b୧,୨ ൈ 100	%
୩
୨ୀଵ
 (4) 
where bi,j is 1 if bit i of PUF j is 1.  
We have evaluated the possible spatial effect of line 
resistances (Rline), as shown in Fig. 8. The results obtained for 
the 250 simulated arrays are illustrated in Fig. 9 for Rline = 2Ω. 
Every pixel corresponds to the bit-aliasing result of a particular 
bit according to its position. At a first sight, bit-aliasing is seen 
randomly distributed along the array which indicates that there 
is not a significant influence of the position over the generation 
of a secret bit. However, a slightly spatial trend is noticed 
related to the routing of BL lines. In the figure, the background 
color is lighter at the upper side than the lower side of the array. 
Cells located far away from the voltage sources of BLs (upper 
part of the array) reported on average lower bit-aliasing values 
than the ones located at the bottom part. This fact means that 
there is a slight higher probability for RRAMs in the upper side 
to remain at HRS values. This issue may be of concern for 
arrays with a relationship between size and line resistance 
which may cause a non-negligible voltage drop in cells located 
far away from the BL voltage sources.  
 Fig. 7. HDintra results for 256 responses of 128-bits at different temperatures. 
 Fig. 8. 2x2 1T1R array including line resistances.  
  Fig. 9. Bit-aliasing results for Rline = 2Ω. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This work presents a novel PUF-like primitive based on 
resistive random access memory (RRAM) technology. The 
inherent variability of the switching mechanism of RRAMs is 
exploited to generate random (secret) bits. A cell topology is 
proposed for a regular 1T1R array were slight and regular 
modifications are introduced. A simultaneous set operation of 
two RRAMs is used to provoke a chaotic differential unbalance 
and quantization of the currents required to set them. The 
subsequent measurement of the resistance in one of the two 
RRAMs provides the random secret bit. Experimental evidence 
of this fact is presented. Contrary to state of the art proposals, a 
regular sense amplifier is sufficient and no additional sensing 
capabilities are required.  
Electrical simulations were performed to analyze the 
response of the PUF-like primitive in terms of uniformity, 
uniqueness, robustness and bit-aliasing. The promising results 
pave the way to continue the exploration of this security 
primitive in hardware security applications. Future work will be 
focused on further experimental validation of this proposal. 
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